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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 12-3507 
_______________ 
 
WILLIAM F. METZ, 
 
        Petitioner 
    
v. 
 
FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION; 
CARMEUSE LIME, INC., 
 
        Respondents 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Administration 
MSHA-1: PENN 2009-514-DM 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 30, 2013 
 
BEFORE: JORDAN, VANASKIE and COWEN,  Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: July 29, 2013) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
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 Appellant William Metz (“Metz”) appeals a decision of the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Review Commission (“Commission”).  The Commission affirmed a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who, after conducting a hearing, concluded that Metz’s 
discharge by Appellee Carmeuse Lime, Inc. (“Carmeuse”) was not a violation of section 
105(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c).  We will 
affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we set forth only the facts that are necessary for our 
analysis. 
 Metz worked as a millwright at Carmeuse.  In early 2009, contractors began 
removing and replacing four kilns that were used in the process of creating lime from 
limestone.  Metz expressed concern for the safety of the contractors and Carmeuse 
employees to a number of people in Carmeuse management. 
 Around the same time, Metz met with Melissa Croll, a corporate human resources 
manager, about Carmeuse’s new “on-call” policy for hourly employees.  Metz and Croll 
both testified about the meeting at the ALJ hearing.  The ALJ determined that their 
testimony could not be reconciled.  Croll testified that Metz used profanity at the meeting, 
was loud and aggressive, and apparently lunged at Croll when he left the meeting.  Metz 
testified that he did not use profanity towards Croll at the meeting. 
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 After the meeting, Croll undertook an investigation and discovered several prior 
instances of similar conduct involving Metz.  Carmeuse decided to terminate Metz’s 
employment because of his “repeated use of profane, vile, threatening and/or abusive 
language in the workplace.”  (App. 352.)  Metz requested peer review of his termination; 
this request was denied due to the sensitive nature of some of the information gathered 
during the investigation. 
 Metz filed a complaint with the Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”), 
claiming that Carmeuse discriminated against him for making a safety-related complaint.  
The MSHA concluded that no discrimination occurred.  Thereafter, Metz filed a 
discrimination complaint with the Commission.  An ALJ held a three-day hearing and 
issued an opinion, concluding that Metz’s discharge did not violate section 105(c)(3) of the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act.  In his written decision, the ALJ found that Croll was 
credible in her testimony relating to the meeting with Metz, and that Metz was evasive in 
his testimony.  (App. 464.)  Metz appealed to the Commission, which affirmed the ALJ 
decision.  One commissioner issued a dissenting opinion.  This appeal followed.
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II. 
A. 
                                                   
1
 The Commission had jurisdiction over this matter under 30 U.S.C. § 823(d).  We have 
jurisdiction under 30 U.S.C. § 816.  We review legal conclusions de novo.  Cumberland 
Coal Res., LP v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 515 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 
2008).  “The findings of the Commission with respect to questions of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.”  Id. (quoting 
30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1)). 
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 First, Metz argues that the Commission erred in affirming the ALJ’s determination 
that Carmeuse rebutted Metz’s prima facie case of discrimination.  In order to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination under section 105(c)(3), a complainant must prove, by 
the preponderance of the evidence “(1) that he engaged in a protected activity, and (2) that 
the adverse action was motivated in any part by the protected activity.”  Sec’y of Labor on 
behalf of Pasula v. Consolidation Coal Co., 2 FMSHRC 2786, 2799 (1980), reversed on 
other grounds sub nom. Consol Coal Co. v. Marshall, 663 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1981).  The 
employer can rebut the prima facie case by showing by the preponderance of the evidence 
“that the complainant did not engage in protected activity or that the adverse action was in 
no part motivated by protected activity.”  Sec’y of Labor on behalf of Robinette v. United 
Castle Coal Co., 3 FMSHRC 803, 818 n.20 (1981).   
 The ALJ found that Metz established a prima facie case and the Commission 
concluded that substantial evidence supported this determination.  We agree that substantial 
evidence supports this conclusion, because Metz made several safety-related complaints 
prior to his termination. 
 The ALJ found that Carmeuse rebutted the prima facie case by showing that Metz 
was terminated due to his “repeated use of profane, vile, threatening and/or abusive 
language in the workplace.”  (App. 352.)  This finding was based in large part on the ALJ’s 
determination that Metz’s testimony about his use of profane language was “evasive” and 
that Croll’s account was credible.  (App. 464.)  The Commission concluded that this 
determination was supported by substantial evidence. 
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 On appeal, Metz’s primary argument is that the ALJ’s credibility determination was 
not supported by substantial evidence.  Essentially, Metz urges this Court to disregard the 
ALJ’s determination that Metz was “evasive” in his testimony and conclude that Metz was 
more credible than Croll.  We decline to do so.  Overturning an ALJ’s credibility 
determination is an “extraordinary step,” as credibility determinations are entitled to a great 
deal of deference.  See Keystone Coal Mining Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 17 FMSHRC 1819, 
1881 (1995), affirmed by 151 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  We decline to take such an 
“extraordinary step.”  Here, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s 
finding that Metz was not credible and that Carmeuse was able to rebut the prima facie 
case.
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B. 
 Metz also argues that the ALJ and the Commission failed to follow Texas 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), by not adequately 
examining the evidence to determine whether Carmeuse’s reasons for terminating Metz 
                                                   
2
 Metz also argues that we should conclude that Carmeuse failed to rebut the prima facie 
case because Metz’s alleged conduct did not warrant termination and because the ALJ 
improperly relied on testimony of other witnesses, including certain testimony that is 
“double-hearsay.”  Since we must use the highly deferential substantial evidence standard, 
these arguments are without merit.  There is substantial evidence in the record to justify the 
ALJ’s determination that Metz was terminated because of his use of profane language, and 
even if the ALJ were to disregard some of the testimony that Metz objects to (even though 
hearsay is permitted at such hearings, see 29 C.F.R. § 2700.63(a)), there is still substantial 
evidence in the record to support a finding that Carmeuse would have terminated Metz’s 
employment even absent his safety-related complaints.   
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were pretextual.  Metz argues that, under Burdine, he is entitled to a “full and fair 
opportunity to demonstrate pretext.”  Id. at 1095. 
 We conclude that both the ALJ and the Commission considered and rejected Metz’s 
arguments that his termination was pretextual, and the ALJ engaged in a lengthy discussion 
about whether Carmeuse’s proffered business justifications for terminating Metz were 
pretextual.  (See App. 465-468.)  Metz argues that the ALJ failed to consider certain 
evidence present in the record such as evidence of animus about Metz’s safety complaints.  
But, the ALJ considered whether Metz was a victim of disparate treatment and concluded 
that Carmeuse did not have a general intolerance of safety related complaints.  Notably, the 
ALJ found that other Carmeuse employees made similar complaints about the safety of the 
kiln contractor, and there is no evidence that any of them were terminated.  Metz also 
argues that his termination was pretextual because the record reveals that other Carmeuse 
employees have used vulgar language and were not terminated.  The ALJ addressed and 
rejected this argument, and there is substantial evidence in the record to support that 
conclusion.  Finally, Metz argues that Carmeuse’s denial of peer review for Metz’s 
termination is evidence that his termination was pretextual because Carmeuse generally 
permits peer review of termination decisions.  The ALJ accepted Carmeuse’s argument that 
peer review was not offered in this case due to the sensitive nature of some of the 
allegations in the case.  Again, the record contains substantial evidence to support this 
conclusion. 
III. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Review Commission. 
